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A Limit on Downsizing:
Varity Corp. v. Howe
James B. Shein*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last fifteen years, over forty-three million jobs have been elimi-
nated in the United States.' Companies affected by these job losses in-
clude AT&T, Tenneco, Sears, and Xerox.' While there have been mil-
lions of new jobs created, the trend to continue to downsize is becom-
ing the "holy grail of corporate management."3 Until recently, most of
the employees terminated or laid off in these downsizings, also known
as re-engineerings, reductions-in-force, or "voluntary retirements," were
unsuccessful in maintaining their jobs or recovering their benefits.4
The recent decision in Varity Corp. v. Howe,5 however, marked the
first time that the United States Supreme Court empowered employees
* Dr. Shein received his engineering degree from Purdue University and his MBA
and Doctorate from Indiana University. He will receive his Juris Doctorate in May of
1997 from Loyola University of Chicago, where he also teaches in the Graduate
School of Business. Dr. Shein was previously the Chief Executive Officer of
Northbrook Corporation.
1. Louis Uchitelle & N.R. Kleinfeld, The Downsizing of America, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
3, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. The article was the first
in a series focusing on the millions of employment casualties caused by severe cut-
backs in the manufacturing industry, the health industry, and the legal profession. Id.;
see N.R. Kleinfeld, The Downsizing of America: In the Workplace Musical Chairs, the
Company as Family, No More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS,
News Library, NYT File.
2. Uchiteile & Kleinfeld, supra note 1, at Al. AT&T plans to cut 40,000 jobs,
Tenneco has cut 11,000 jobs, Sears has cut 50,000 jobs, and Xerox plans to cut
10,000 jobs. Id.
3. Alex Markels & Matt Murray, Call It Dumbsizing: Why Some Companies Re-
gret Cost-Cutting, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL-WSJ
3102858.
4. See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
5. 116 S. Ct 1065 (1996).
victimized by downsizing to successfully sue their plan administrators.6
Prior to this decision, employees could not recover on their own behalf,
but rather could only bring suit on behalf of the plan.7 In Varity, the
Court held that employers may incur fiduciary liability under the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)8 through their
conduct as plan administrators.9 Most significantly, the Court held that
employees could sue as individuals and seek equitable relief for a
breach of this fiduciary obligation.'" As a result of this ruling, legal ex-
perts have predicted a dramatic increase in litigation over changes in
benefit plans and other consequences of downsizing."
This Note first reviews the background of corporate downsizing,'2
the common law roots of ERISA, 3 Congress's actions in creating
ERISA,' 4 and the key cases leading up to Varity.5 The majority and
dissenting opinions in Varity are then discussed.'6 Next, this Note ana-
lyzes the decision in Varity, as well as the alternative logic the Court
could have used, and proposes a "safe harbor" for employers who still
need freedom to operate their organizations.'7 Finally, this Note pre-
dicts the impact that Varity will have on future litigation and on man-
agement decisions.'8
6. Id. at 1075-76.
7. Id.; see infra Part I.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
9. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1074.
10. Id. at 1079. Before this, an individual could sue only as a representative of the
plan. For example, an individual could seek to force a dishonest fiduciary to return
funds he embezzled to the plan, but could not try to recover individually. Id. at 1075-
76.
11. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Corporate Cuts Spur Suits by Angry Workers; Em-
ployees Seek Protection for Benefit Pension Plans, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1996, § 1, at
1, available in 1996 WL 2656910. Major law firms even predict the need to "beef up"
their practice in response to the Varity ruling. Id.
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See infra Part HI.B.
14. See infra Part I.C.
15. See infra Part .D.
16. See infra Part II, notes 174-211 and accompanying text. As part of the discus-
sion, the lower court opinions will be examined, including the multiple rulings and
published opinions at the appellate level. See infra Part HII.B, notes 143-73 and ac-
companying text
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Corporate Downsizing
In the past, employers typically terminated employees for many rea-
sons, but large-scale downsizing was usually done solely because the
company needed to survive short-term. 9 More recently, however, em-
ployers have downsized to increase earnings, to become more competi-
tive, or to boost the price of the company's stock.0
Most litigation following downsizings initially focuses on employees
who allege violations on grounds other than ERISA.2' Litigants most
often cite age discrimination' as the cause for their termination,
claiming there are invariably younger, lower paid employees still at the
company. The circuits have been split, however, on the requisite burden
of proof when there is evidence of both age discrimination and large-
scale downsizing.' Similar disputes arise when an employee claims his
or her selection for termination violated other statutes.24
19. These cases often wound up being adjudicated in the Federal Bankruptcy
Courts. See, e.g., In re America West Airlines, Inc., 171 B.R. 674 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1994) (airline downsized under Chapter 11); In re Atron, Inc., 172 B.R. 541, 542
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994) (under a reorganization plan, employer discharged employ-
ees as "part of a general downsizing of [the] . . .workforce").
20. Carrie R. Leana, Why Downsizing Won't Work, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 14, 1996, Sun-
day Magazine, at 15.
21. Employees often focus their first efforts at regaining their jobs. For a listing of
cases brought by terminated employees, see infra note 24. ERISA is limited in its
scope to certain types of benefit plans. See infra Part ll.C (discussing the key provi-
sions of ERISA).
22. The claimed violation is usually of- the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, as amended. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). If the employee claims the employ-
er pressured the employee into volunteering for early retirement, a claim may be
brought under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 626, 630
(1994).
23. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has stated that the plaintiff must prove that
the termination would not have occurred "but for" the employers motive to discrimi-
nate against the employee for the employee's age. Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp.
Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit looks. only to whether
the plaintiff proved that age made any difference in the decision. Montana v. First
Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n, 869 F.2d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 1989).
24. See Frank C. Morris, Litigation Challenges to Reductions in Force, 108 A.I.-
A.B.A. 181 (1995). See, e.g., Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1994) (former
employee alleged violations of ERISA, ADEA, and state law when the employer mis-
led employee into taking early retirement); Fitzgerald v. Alleghany Corp., 904 F. Supp.
223 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (disabled employee cited infirmity as reason selected to leave);
Even when the termination is inevitable, the loss of benefits per-
ceived by employees as already earned has led to both group and indi-
vidual litigation.25 Before ERISA, employees had to rely primarily on
common law to prevent their pension or benefit loss, regardless of
whether the loss was a result of downsizing or the closing of a busi-
ness.
26
B. Common Law Roots of ERISA
The applicable common law of trusts, even when partially codified
into some states' laws, dealt primarily with the protection of assets held
by a trust.27 Prior to 1974, whether or not to fund a plan at all was a
decision left to each employer. The patchwork of state and common
laws did not hold employers or plan administrators liable for inade-
quate funding or for the loss of anticipated benefits due to the lack of
vesting provisions.28
Trustees of plan assets and plan administrators were considered fi-
duciaries of employer benefit and retirement plans.' At common law,
Luongo v. Lawner, 1995 WL 96901 (D. Mass. 1995) (employee claimed she was cho-
sen for discharge because she was pregnant); see also Purvey v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., No. 94-6102, 1995 WL 30918 (10th Cir. Jan. 27, 1995) (employee claimed race
was the real reason for his firing); Taylor v. NCR Corp., No. 93-3538, 1994 WL
665549 (6th Cir. Nov. 28, 1994) (employee claimed sex discrimination was the actual
reason for discharge).
25. There has been limited success litigating under state law contract theory. See,
e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (implied in fact prom-
ises are found in personnel practices, longevity of service, and employer communica-
tions). Federal statutes outside of ERISA focus on short-term aid-health plan bene-
fits must be provided short-term under circumstances proscribed by part of the Con-
solidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA). 26 U.S.C. § 4980B
(1994). Plant closings or mass layoffs also lead to litigation for violation of the Work-
er Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), which requires either 60 days
written notice to employees and to affected state and local governments, or the pay-
ment of 60 extra days of wages and benefits. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).
26. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. The Court in Varity looked to
the common law to interpret certain ERISA provisions. See infra Part III.C.
27. See, e.g., GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 260 (rev. 2d ed. 1993). The common law was used to
compel trustees of union welfare funds with conflicts of interest to restore fund as-
sets. Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971).
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994) (congressional findings concerning state of the
law prior to ERISA).
29. A plan administrator is a fiduciary when performing most functions. See, e.g.,
In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1261, n.10 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding when a plan administrator explains plan benefits to its employees,
it acts in a fiduciary capacity), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996); see also Musto v.
American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 910 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding employers must satis-
fy fiduciary duties when administering benefit plans).
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a fiduciary is a person who acts in the interest of another person.'
Much litigation has surrounded the definition of the duties and respon-
sibilities of the fiduciary or plan administrator when acting in their
official capacities.3 A fiduciary or plan administrator is held to a high-
er standard than that applied to normal working interrelationships.'
Under common law, the court of equity remedied a fiduciary duty
violation." The remedies included money damages against the
trustee;34 however, courts generally refused to grant punitive damages
in equity cases.' Therefore, employees often looked to other causes of
action for broader state-imposed remedies.'
Non-fiduciaries can also be liable for knowingly participating in a
fiduciary's breach of duty.37 This concept becomes important when an
organization takes on multiple responsibilities as employer, plan admin-
istrator, and trustee.' Additionally, if a "trustee holds in trust a con-
tract right against a third person and the trustee refuses to bring an
action to enforce the contract, the beneficiaries can maintain a suit." '
30. 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN Scor & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 170, at 311-12 (4th ed. 1987). A duty of loyalty requires a trustee to deal fairly and
honestly with beneficiaries. Id.
31. For a discussion of case law defining a fiduciary, see Robert N. Eccles, Fidu-
ciary Litigation Under ERISA: Substantive Aspects, 23 KLI.-A.B.A. 125 (1996).
32. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Chief Judge Cardozo wrote,
"[m]any forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.... Not honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." Id,
33. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1993) (citing Lessee of Smith
v. McCann, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 398, 407 (1861)).
34. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 27, § 701, at 198; see United States v. Mitchell,'
463 U.S. 206, 225-26 (1983).
35. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257 n.7 (citing D. *DOBBS; REMEDIES § 3.9, at 211 (1973)).
36. Pre-ERISA disputes regarding denial of benefits also looked to contract law for
remedies. See, e.g., Conner v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 249 A.2d 866, 868 (Del. 1969);
Atlantic Steel Co. v. Kitchens, 187 S.E.2d 824, 827-28 (Ga. 1972).
37. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (holding U.S. De-
partment of Indian Affairs liable to native beneficiaries of a trust because officials
knew trustees were misappropriating funds).
38. See ivfra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. The common law understanding
of the term fiduciary administration was the exercise of powers conferred by (or per-
formance of the duties imposed by) the trust documents. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 164 (1957).
39. McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 110 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing 4 A. SCOTT,
LAW OF TRusrS § 282.1, at 2339 (3d ed. 1967)).
Common law protections proved inadequate for many beneficia-
ries.4" One notorious case was the 1963 closing of the Studebaker plant
in South Bend, Indiana, which caused more than four thousand employ-
ees to lose all of their pensions.4' Congress found too many pensions
to be illusory and cited the Studebaker shutdown, with its loss of more
than eighty-five percent of vested benefits, as one major example.42
C. Key Provisions of ERISA
Because of these and broader concerns43 regarding the abuses of
plan employers and sponsors, Congress enacted the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974.4 Congress based its decision to
enact ERISA on a decade of studies suggesting that the nation's private
pension plans were failing.45 Congress found that employer pension
plans were underfunded, and thus, millions of employees were deprived
of their expected benefits.46
The purpose of ERISA is to protect "the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries,... by establishing stan-
dards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of em-
ployee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanc-
40. See JOHN LANGBEIN & BRUCE WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 64-65
(1st ed. 1990) (citing Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, re-
printed in Special Committee on Aging, The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974: The First Decade, S. Prt. No. 221, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 1, 10-11 (1983)).
41. Although a district court granted a preliminary injunction preventing Studebaker
from terminating the plan, the employees eventually lost. See International Union,
UAW v. Studebaker Corp., 50 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 19,307 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 30, 1964).
42. H.R. REP. No. 93-2, at 1599 (1973). Other examples included instances of multi-
employer plan participants who sold their operations, leaving insufficient assets to
pay benefits to even vested participants. Id. at 1600. Studies by the Departments of
Labor and Treasury showed over 19,000 workers lost vested benefits the prior year
alone. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 n.22 (1980).
43. Congressional investigations of pension plan employers showed rampant embez-
zlement, kickbacks, excessive cross-charges, and purchases of securities which were
conflicts of interest See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 40, at 59.
44. Pub. L No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994)).
45. Nachman, 446 U.S. at 361-62. Congress wanted to prevent the "great personal
tragedy" employees suffer when vested benefits are not paid because plans are termi-
nated. Id. at 374.
46. Id. at 362; see ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
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tions, and ready access to the Federal Courts."47 Congress enacted the
statute in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries.48
Congress intentionally invoked the common law of trusts in the stat-
ute to broaden the scope of the responsibility of fiduciaries such as
trustees and plan administrators.49 ERISA "abounds with the language
and terminology of trust law."'
The relevant part of ERISA59 ' that specifically translates the common
law of fiduciary responsibilities is section 404, which requires that ac-
tions be taken for the benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries. 2
Section 404(a) directs plan fiduciaries, including plan administrators, to
act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" and to
act with the "exclusive purpose" to provide plan benefits and to defray
reasonable plan administration expenses.' Courts have generally treat-
ed the "solely in the interest" and "exclusive purpose" concepts inter-
changeably, as part of the codification of the common law of trusts'
requisite duty of undivided loyalty.'
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994). To minimize the conflicts among states and limit
the financial burden of complying with multiple jurisdictions, ERISA preempts all
state laws regarding benefit plans. Ingersoll Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,
138-39 (1990); see ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
48. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
49. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp.,
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985); see H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 11 (1973), reprinted in
1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649. Pre-ERISA common law remedies for a breach of fidu-
ciary duty are also applicable. Coar v. Kamizir, 990 F.2d 1413, 1422-24 (3d Cir. 1993).
50. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989).
51. A full discussion of ERISA is beyond the scope of this Note. It is important to
note, however, that Congress also traded away already existing rights. Common law
and state law causes of action for employees, such as misrepresentation or fraudulent
inducement by their employers, were no longer allowed, as they were preempted by
ERISA. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
52. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1994). A goal of the statute
was to establish "'enforceable standards to insure honest, faithful, and competent
management of pension and welfare funds.'" Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rus-
sell, 473 U.S. 134, 141 n.8 (1985) (citing 120 CONG. REC. 29954 (1974) (statement of
Sen. Williams)); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.c.C..N. 4795. Congress intended this provision to codify the strict duty of loyalty
that fiduciaries owe to beneficiaries. Central States, 472 U.S. at 570-71.
53. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994); see also NLRB v. Amax Coal
Co., 453 U.S. 322, 330-32 (1981) (discussing how a trustee with divided loyalties must
try to prevent any injury to the beneficiary).
54. See Eccles, supra note 31, at 139. The courts have spent considerable effort
trying to further define these terms under fact-specific litigation. Id. at 139-44.
A breach of these responsibilities permits relief under several sec-
tions of ERISA, including sections 409(a) and 502(a).' Under section
409(a), a fiduciary can be held personally liable for losses to the plan
resulting from his or her breach and can be subject to other equitable
relief.'
Section 502(a) provisions are intended to provide both participants
and beneficiaries "with broad remedies for redressing or preventing
violations" of ERISA.57 The causes of action created in section
55. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994); ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a) (1994). ERISA § 409 is referenced in § 502(a)(2); see infra note 56.
56. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). Congressional Committee Reports empha-
size a fiduciary's personal liability for losses to the plan. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-
1280 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 5038. Section 409(a) provides:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this
subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses
to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the
plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedi-
al relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fidu-
ciary.
ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
57. See S. REP. No. 93-127 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4838, 1 Leg.
Hist., at 621 (Senate version); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprinted in 2 Leg.
Hist, at 2364 (House version). Section 502(a) reads in its entirety:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this
section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fidu-
ciary for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin
any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for
appropriate relief in the case of a violation of [section] 1025(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this
section, by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this
subchapter, or
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under sub-
section (c)(2) or (i) or (1) of this section.
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502(a)(2) allow the Secretary of Labor, participants, beneficiaries, and
fiduciaries to obtain "appropriate relief" under section 409 for viola-
tions of fiduciary responsibilities.' Section 502(a)(3) allows a partici-
pant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to obtain "any other appropriate relief"°
to redress violations."
Congress added other remedies when it passed Title V62 of ERISA,
creating the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC).'3 Con-
gress established the PBGC, which is funded with insurance-like premi-
ums paid by employers, to protect employees against the loss of nonfor-
feitable or vested benefits.' The PBGC ensures employees that they
will receive a portion of their vested benefits.' If the plan fails and the
PBGC steps in to pay employees, the PBGC has the right to sue the
employer.'
ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
58. Defining "appropriate relief" is the subject of ongoing litigation. See infta notes
107-19 and accompanying text.
59. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
60. Defining "any other appropriate relief" is at the heart of Varity. See invtf
notes 174-211 and accompanying text.
61. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
62. Pub. L No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 1003 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1311 (1994)).
63. ERISA §§ 4002(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1994). This section provides:
There is established within the Department of Labor a body corporate to be
known as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. In carrying out its func-
tions under this subchapter, the corporation shall be administered by the
chairman of the board of directors in accordance with policies established by
the board. The purposes of this subchapter, which are to be carried out by
the corporation, are-(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of
voluntary private pension plans for the benefit of their participants, (2) to
provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to par-
ticipants and beneficiaries under plans to which this title applies, and (3) to
maintain premiums established by the corporation under section 4006 at the
lowest level consistent with carrying out its obligations under this title.
Id.
64. ERISA § 4006, 29 U.S.C. § 1306 (1994).
65. Id.
66. ERISA § 4062(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (1994). This section provides in par
Any employer to which this section applies shall be liable to the corporation,
in an amount equal to the lesser of- (1) the excess of- (A) the current
value of the plan's benefits guaranteed under this title on the date of termi-
nation over (B) the current value of the plan's assets allocable to such bene-
fits on the date of termination, or (2) 30 percent of the net worth of the em-
ployer.
The ERISA statute attempted to define the activities that make a
person a fiduciary with respect to a plan.67 Under ERISA, a person is a
fiduciary with respect to a plan to the "extent he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such
plan."' An employer is also allowed to act both as plan administrator
and plan sponsor.'
D. Judicial Interpretation of ERISA
Since the passage of ERISA, federal courts have adjudicated thou-
sands of cases to further define who is a fiduciary, what duties are im-
posed, what transactions are prohibited, and what remedies are appro-
priate for a breach of fiduciary duty.'0 In defining who is a fiduciary,
courts have emphasized the broad sweep of the statutory definition as
well as the limitations it creates.7 The Court in John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank" created one limi-
tation on liability when it recognized that someone is a fiduciary only to
the extent he performs one of the described fiduciary duties, acting
sometimes as a fiduciary and sometimes in his own interests.7'
Id.
In other words, the employer must reimburse the PBGC for payments made
from PBGC funds to cover nonforfeitable benefits to the extent that the pen-
sion fund was unable to pay them, but in no event is the employer liable to
the PBGC for more than 3096 of its net worth.
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 363 n.4 (1980).
67. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994).
68. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii). A person is also a "fiduciary
with respect to a plan" under ERISA
to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary
control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, [or] (ii) he ren-
ders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any au-
thority or responsibility to do so.
ERISA § 3(21)(A)(i)-(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i)-(ii). In Varity, the parties appeared
to agree that Varity Corporation's status as a fiduciary turned on subsection (iii),
relating to plan administration. See infra Part Ill.C.
69. ERISA § 408(C)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(C)(3) (1994).
70. For a comprehensive review of relevant cases on each of these areas, broken
into a number of subtopics, see Eccles, supra note 31.
71. See, e.g. Sladek v. Bell Sys. Management Pension Plan, 880 F.2d 972, 976 (7th
Cir. 1989); Olson v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 957 F.2d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1992). The rele-
vant section of the ERISA statute is § 3(21)(A). See supra note 68 and accompanying
text.
72. 510 U.S. 86 (1993).
73. Id. at 95-97; see also Davidowitz v. Delta Dental Plan, Inc., 946 F.2d 1476, 1481
(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that a person can act as a fiduciary at times, yet act in his
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In Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v.
Central Transportation, Inc. the Court stated that Congress did not
enumerate all the duties of trustees.74 Congress specifically invoked
the common law of trusts to further define those duties, 5 and as the
Court in NLRB v. Amax Coal Co. stated, unless Congress expresses an
unequivocal intent to the contrary, the Court must infer that Congress
intentionally imposed the traditional duties of a trustee.' A duty of
loyalty is therefore owed to a beneficiary, and the interests of all other
parties must be excluded.'
The very nature of the various roles employers play with regard to
pension plans gives rise to potential conflicts among employers' duties
as fiduciaries. These conflicts do not mean, however, that the employer
automatically breaches its fiduciary responsibilities when it makes
"business decisions." A company, for example, does not necessarily act
in its fiduciary capacity when deciding to amend or terminate a welfare
benefits plan.' In Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, the Court
held that "[elmployers or other plan sponsors are generally free under
ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate wel-
fare plans."' The Court also noted that ERISA does not create entitle-
ment to benefits.N
The courts have also struggled with many instances where employers
have come close to or crossed the line between their right to make
business decisions and their obligations as trustees or fiduciaries. This
can be particularly troublesome for employees when an employer sells
own interests at others); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d
Cir. 1990) ("[F]iduciary duties under ERISA attach not just to particular persons, but
to particular persons performing particular functions.").
74. 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985).
75. Id.
76. 453 U.S. 322, 330 (1981).
77. Id. at 329.
78. See Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990); see also
Waller v. Blue Cross, 32 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 1994) (deciding to terminate an employee
benefit plan is a business decision and does not invoke obligations as a fiduciary);
Malia v. General Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 828 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating business decisions
related to changes in a pension plan are those of a plan sponsor acting as an em-
ployer, not as a fiduciary).
79. 115 S. Ct. 1223, 1228 (1995). The company amended its health care benefit
plan, providing that coverage terminates for retirees and their dependents when the
business operations cease at the facility from which they retired. Id. at 1227.
80. Id. at 1228.
one of its facilities. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,"' the
company sold its plastics division and neither paid benefits nor provid-
ed information to the employees who were rehired by the new owner
of the plant.' The Court held that there was a duty to the former em-
ployees, and that information need only be provided to those reason-
ably expected to return to employment or to employees with a "color-
able claim" to vested benefits.83
Other courts have looked at asset sales of troubled companies when
the transactions affected employee benefits.' When International Har-
vester sold its Wisconsin Steel subsidiary to the small company
Envirodyne, International Harvester loaned Envirodyne the money for
the acquisition and transferred all pension obligations to it.' When
Envirodyne subsequently filed bankruptcy, the PBGC tried to assess
liability against the "selling" company under ERISA. 6 The court held
that liability arises when a "principal purpose" of the business decision
is to avoid pension liability and refused to dismiss PBGC's claim for
predecessor liability. 7
By contrast, the PBGC failed to attach fiduciary liability to Doskosil
Company for Doskosil's sale of its Wilson Foods meat plants and subse-
quent bankruptcy.' The court denied proofs of claim totalling $53 mil-
lion in unfunded pension benefits because Doskosil was no longer the
employer.'
81. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
82. Id. at 105. Firestone denied the terminated employees severance benefits from
an ERISA covered plan, contending that the sale of the business was not covered by
the company's termination plan as a "reductioh in work force." Id. at 106.
83. Id. at 110. The Court noted that the likelihood of imposition of $100 per day
penalties under ERISA § 1132(c)(1)(B) would act as an incentive for the company to
provide information to anyone who "may become eligible" as a participant. Id. at 118.
84. See, e.g., In re Consolidated Litig. Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of
Wis. Steel, 681 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. M11. 1988); In re Doskosil Co., Inc., 130 B.R. 858
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1991).
85. International Harvester's, 681 F. Supp. at 515.
86. Id. The bankruptcy of Envirodyne was triggered when International Harvester
foreclosed on the acquisition loans. Id. at 516.
87. Id. at 526. The district court also considered whether the buyer objectively
lacked a reasonable chance of meeting those obligations before concluding that
PBGC's claims against International Harvester could not be dismissed. Id. at 525-27.
88. Doskosil, 130 B.R. at 860-61.
89. The bankruptcy court noted that ERISA § 1369, which attaches liability to
anyone with the principal purpose of evasion of responsibility, became effective on
January 1, 1986, two years after the Wilson transaction. Id. at 868. The court also
noted, however, that the facts in this case were not as egregious as in International
Harvester. Id. at 867.
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Misrepresentations by employers have also been treated various ways
by the courts, depending on the facts as much as the law.' In Berlin
v. Michigan Telephone Co.,9 employees who were told they only had
the opportunity for reduced benefits upon early retirement, when the
company actually had other intentions, could maintain a cause of action
against their employer.2 Similarly, in the Third Circuit, an employer
who served as a plan fiduciary had a duty to not make affirmative mis-
representations dealing with prospective plan changes.' Another em-
ployer who did not disclose that the company was seriously contem-
plating significant downsizing, but who made general statements about
the company's strong financial health, was not liable for breach of fidu-
ciary duty. 4
Some courts have not looked favorably on intentional lying by em-
ployers. The Second Circuit has affirmatively stated that "'when a
[fiduciary] speaks, it must speak truthfully.'"95 The Seventh Circuit has
noted that "[l1ying is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all
fiduciaries."' The Fifth Circuit has noted that even subjective good
faith is not always a valid defense, stating that "a pure heart and an
empty head are not enough."97
Sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) establish the principal causes of
action available under ERISA for a breach of fiduciary duty.' As to
section 502(a)(2), the Court in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Russell' held that Congress did not authorize any relief except
90. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
91. 858 F.2d 1154 (6th Cir. 1988).
92. Id. at 1156. The plaintiffs accepted early retirement based on the initial state-
ments of the employer, only to find out that better benefits would be available short-
ly for those who waited. Id. at 1163-64.
93. Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996).
94. Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 880 F. Supp. 63, 69-70 (D.C. Mass. 1995). The court
decided that the misrepresentations concerned business plans, not benefit plans. Id. at
70.
95. Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Drennan v.
General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992)).
96. Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn Mut Life Ins. Co., 698
F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983). The court also noted that Congress codified this con-
cept in § 404(a) of ERISA. Id.
97. Donovan, v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983).
98. For the text of § 502 and discussion of the causes of action it provides, see
supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
99. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
that sought for the plan itself."° In Russell, a beneficiary under an em-
ployee benefit plan administered by Massachusetts Mutual became dis-
abled with a back ailment and the company terminated her benefits
based on erroneous information.'"' While retroactive benefits were
paid after an appeal,0 2 the beneficiary sued for additional damages
caused by the improper initial denial of her claim and what she had to
do to get the benefits paid."n She based her claim on section 409,04
disclaiming any reliance on section 502(a)(3),' ° and sought extra con-
tractual damages for herself as an individual rather than on behalf of
the plan itself.'"
After reviewing the statute and interpreting the intent of Congress,
the Court held that relief was authorized only for the benefit plan itself,
and not for individual beneficiaries."' Since the ruling in Russell, all
the circuits have disallowed section 502(a)(2) actions where individual
beneficiaries requested recovery."'° In his concurring opinion, Justice
Brennan"4 stated "we save for another day" the question of the nature
and extent of the appropriate equitable relief to redress violations un-
der section 502(a)(3)." °
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,"' the Court ruled that section
502(a)(3) provided for traditional equitable relief only, and not for legal
damages."' In Mertens, when Kaiser Steel phased out its steel-making
100. Id. at 148.
101. Id. at 136.
102. Id.
103. Id. The plaintiff claimed that even though she received both her retroactive
and future benefits, the willful conduct of high-level officials within the company
caused her husband to cash in his retirement savings which aggravated her psycho-
logical and physical problems. Id. at 136-37.
104. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
105. Russell, 473 U.S. at 139 n.5.
106. Id. at 136.
107. Id. at 142. For a more comprehensive analysis of the decision in Russell, see
Christopher F. Robertson, Note, Closing the Massachusetts v. Russell Gap: Monetary
Damage Awards Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 48 WASH. & LEE L REv. 691
(1991).
108. See, e.g., Adamson v. Armco, Inc., 44 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied
116 S. Ct. 85 (1995); Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (2d Cir. 1993); Hozier v.
Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1169 (3d Cir. 1990); Bryant v. International
Fruit Prod. Co., 886 F.2d 132, 135 (6th Cir. 1989); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 824 (Ist Cir. 1988); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 537-38
(9th Cir. 1986).
109. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in the concurrence. Russell, 473
U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 150 (Brennan, J., concurring).
111. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
112. Id. at 256. The Court did not rule on the issue of whether individual causes of
action were permissible under § 502(a)(3).
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operation, prompting a large number of participants in its pension plan
to take early retirement, the company did not change its funding to
reflect the higher costs the plan was then incurring and failed to change
its actuarial assumptions."3 The plaintiffs sought monetary damages
under section 502(a)(3), as equitable relief, from Kaiser's non-fiduciary
actuarial company."'
The Court noted that it could not consider the term "equitable relief'
in section 502(a)(3) to mean "all relief available for breach of trust at
common law.""' The use of section 502(a)(3) as a cause of action
against a non-fiduciary was also incorrect according to the Court,"6
even though ERISA defines fiduciary in broad functional terms of con-
trol and authority over the plan."7 The dissenting opinion did not
agree that Congress stripped trust beneficiaries under ERISA of a reme-
dy that they had under common law: a remedy against third parties and
against trustees."' The dissent stated that the section 502(a)(3) usage
of "appropriate equitable relief" referred to the normal remedy in equity
for a breach, i.e., compensatory monetary damages." 9
Although the Court in Mertens addressed the issue of specific non-
fiduciary remedies under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, the Court did not
clarify how that section applied to a cause of action for breach of a
fiduciary obligation. Specifically, it did not address whether section
502(a)(3) authorizes relief for individuals rather than only for the plan
113. Id. at 250. The defendant was the actuarial firm that allegedly breached its
professional duty when it allowed the company to use erroneous actuarial assump-
tions and did not disclose the inadequate funding of the plan. Id.
114. Id. at 251.
115. Id. at 254-55. The Court concluded that this would require the term to be
given different meaning than elsewhere in ERISA or it would otherwise void the
congressionally drawn distinction between "equitable" and "remedial" relief in
§ 409(a). Id. The Court further noted that ERISA is "an enormously complex and
detailed statute that resolved innumerable disputes between powerful competing inter-
ests-not all in favor of potential plaintiffs." Id. at 256.
116. Id. at 256-57.
117. Id. at 257. The Court looked to ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. 1002(21)(A), to
decide this issue. Id. For a more complete discussion of Mertens, see Elaine
McClatchey Darroch, Note, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates: The Supreme Court's Dis-
mantling of Civil Enforcement Under ERISA, 1994 DET. C.L. REv. 1089. Darroch
recommends that Congress reverse Mertens. Id. at 1111.
118. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined in the
dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and O'Connor. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting).
119. Id. at 260 (White, J., dissenting).
itself, an issue upon which the courts of. appeals were split. The
Ninth'20 and Eleventh Circuits, 2' for example, held that this section
only authorizes suits that seek relief for the plan itself. By contrast, the
Third'22 and Seventh Circuits 2l joined the Eighth'24 in holding that
section 502(a)(3) authorizes relief for individual beneficiaries. The
Court granted certiorari in Varity to resolve this conflict among the
circuits.
Ill. DISCUSSION
A. Facts of Varity
Varity Corporation is a diversified Canadian company which manufac-
tures farm equipment and other products.'25 The company uses the
name Massey-Ferguson for its American farm equipment operations.
26
In 1986, Varity underwent a restructuring and executed a series of
agreements"' by and among its own subsidiaries. The agreements
transferred several of Varity's struggling operations, including Massey-
Ferguson, into a new Canadian corporation owned by Varity, named
Massey Combines Corporation (MCC).'28
120. McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint, Inc., 46 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
Horan v. Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan, 947 F.2d 1412, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that plaintiffs' claim should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim since
they sought individual relief rather than relief on behalf of the plan).
121. Simmons v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 940 F.2d 614, 617 (11th Cir. 1991);
see also Horan, 947 F.2d at 1417-18; Richards v. General Motors Corp., 850 F. Supp.
1325 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding employees could not seek individual relief under
ERISA); Kaiser Permanente Employees Pension Plan v. Bertozzi, 849 F. Supp. 692,
700 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (stating section 502(a)(3) limits recovery to "relief that inures to
the benefit of the plan as a whole").
122. Bixler v. Central Pa Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1298-99
(3d Cir. 1993).
123. Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 993 (7th Cir. 1993).
124. Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 748 (8th Cir. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1065
(1996); see also McCabe v. Trombley, 867 F. Supp. 120 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (allowing
individuals to seek equitable relief under ERISA); Iwans v. Aetna Life Ins. Corp., 855
F. Supp. 579 (D. Conn. 1994) (same).
125. Howe v. Varity Corp., 1989 WL 95595, at *2 (S.D. Iowa July 14, 1989) (Howe
I). The district court's decision is discussed inra notes 143-61 and accompanying
text.
126. Howe I, 1989 WL 95595, at *2.
127. Id. These agreements were known internally as "Project Sunshine." Id.
128. Id. The transferred businesses included the production, distribution, and mar-
keting of combines, certain tractors, balers, and the retail farm equipment stores. Id.
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The strategy "amounted to placing many of Varity's money-losing eggs
in one financially rickety basket."129 Because Varity transferred only its
money-losing divisions and various other debts into the new subsidiary,
any failure of the new MCC would not cause the bankruptcy of
Varity. 3 The failure of MCC would, however, eliminate Varity's worst
performing businesses and also eradicate debts that Varity's more prof-
itable divisions would otherwise be obligated to pay.'3'
Most significantly, Varity also transferred about 1500 employees from
Massey-Ferguson and other poorly performing units to MCC, along with
almost 4000 retirees from various parts of Varity's corporate family.'32
Varity "hoped the reorganization would eliminate [obligations] ... aris-
ing from the Massey-Ferguson benefit plan's promises to pay medical
and other nonpension benefits to employees of Massey-Ferguson's mon-
ey-losing divisions.""w While Varity retained the right to terminate
complete benefit plans of all employees, the restructuring allowed them
to specifically terminate only the benefits of the employees of the poor-
ly performing divisions and other MCC transferees."
Varity encouraged its employees to accept the changes in their bene-
fit plans through special meetings at which employees were told that
their benefits could stay secure if they transferred to the MCC plan
voluntarily. 1" About 1500 employees accepted."w Varity also unilater-
ally assigned the 4000 retirees' benefit obligations to the new company
without informing the retirees of the completed transfer. '
MCC operated at an $88 million loss during its first year" and soon
accumulated debt of almost $400 million.'" Eventually, MCC failed
and went into receivership, ceasing operations and terminating all bene-
fits to the employees and retirees.'40 The employees and retirees filed
129. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1068 (1996).
130. Id.
131. Id. About $282 million in debt was transferred to MCC. Howe I, 1989 WL
95595, at *2.
132. Howe I, 1989 WL 95595, at *2. The plans were to be self-insured by MCC. Id.
at *6.
133. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1068.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1069.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Howe I, 1989 WL 95595, at *2.
140. Id.
suit for reinstatement of benefits, including pensions and disability
pay.' They sought the benefits to which they would have been enti-
tled under the previous benefit plan had they not been transferred to
the failed MCC.'42
B. Lower Courts' Decisions
The district court first examined the background of the case" and
made a number of critical findings of fact, the first being that the plain-
tiffs had a right to certain benefits.'" The court determined that the
employee handbook, which summarized the benefits due, indicated that
the "benefits for the company employees continue in retirement."'45
Although Varity pointed out its ability to terminate the plan, the court
instead looked to the handbook as promissory language.'" The court
also determined that the company's practices further supported the
theory that there existed a right to the benefits,'47 inalterably earned
by employees who were either eligible for retirement or disabled.'"
The court found that the writings and the practices of the company
established that "the benefits to which retirees, survivors, eligible de-
pendents and disabled employees became entitled upon their retirement
or disablement were to continue undiminished for their lifetimes."'4 9
Having found that the right to the benefits existed, the court proceed-
ed to determine what entity, if any, could be held liable to pay them.
Varity argued that neither it nor Massey-Ferguson could be held liable
because, under ERISA, they were not employers or fiduciaries of MCC
employees. 5 ° The court looked to ERISA section 1002(5) for
definitional guidance on the term "employer."'5 ' Determining Varity
141. Id.
142. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1069 (1996). The district court cited
ERISA § 404(a) for the breach of fiduciary obligations and cited § 502(a)(3) as giving
employees the right to "appropriate equitable relief." See infra Part II.B.
143. See supra Part IU.A.
144. Howe I, 1989 WL 95595, at *2-3. The court separately looked to who could be
held liable for the benefits. Id. at *5. If it were MCC, then there was nothing left
from which the plaintiffs could collect any judgment. Id. at *9.
145. Id. at *3. These benefits included "basic health, major medical, dental health,
vision care and hearing benefits." Id.
146. Id. at *24.
147. Id. The court again ignored the termination rights that the company reserved
and examined letters sent by executives to employees and long-standing policies to
maintain the provision of benefits to retirees. Id. at *3-4.
148. Id. The court looked at explicit vesting language in the plan documents, again
ignoring Varity's separate right to terminate the plan. Id. at *4. Varity's right to termi-
nate benefits for active employees was not in dispute. Id. at *5.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The court also looked at the definition of "employer" contained in the Fair
[Vol. 24: 1, 19961 Varity Corp. v. Howe
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
met this definition,'52 the court also noted that Varity played a contin-
uing role in the administration of the MCC benefits plan"w and found
that Varity was an employer under ERISA.M
To determine the issue of fiduciary roles, the court focused on the
ERISA language and the intent of Congress," and found both Varity
and Massey-Ferguson to be fiduciaries under ERISA.'" The court fur-
ther found that they breached their fiduciary duties by making deci-
sions not based on concerns for the beneficiaries'57 and by deliberate-
ly misleading the beneficiaries."w The court decided "that MCC's over-
riding purpose, from its conception to its demise, was to serve the in-
terests of its creator, Varity[,] ... [which included] the unlawful pur-
pose of jettisoning its obligation to pay retirement and disability bene-
fits."1
5 9
The district court ordered that Varity and Massey-Ferguson reinstate
the retirement and disability plans as they existed before the failure of
MCC." ° That decision was immediately appealed. 6'
Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994). The FLSA definition
was relevant because it is similar to the ERISA definition and because more FLSA
case law exists to assist in the examination of the issue. Howe 1, 1989 WL 95595, at
*5. The court noted that courts have been loath to recognize this type of corporate-
form defense when it would undermine Congress's intent under FLSA or ERISA. Id.
152. Howe 1, 1989 WL 95595, at *6.
153. Id.
154. Id. The court also found Massey-Ferguson to be an employer under the statute.
Id.
155. Id. If "a corporation exercises any discretionary authority or control . . . [over
a] benefits plan or the management or disposition of the plan assets," it is a fiducia-
ry under ERISA. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994). For a discussion
on Congressional intent, see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 5038.
156. Howe I, 1989 WL 95595, at *7.
157. Id. at *13. These decisions included Varity's transfer of employees to MCC and
the decision to terminate their benefits. Id.
158. Id. at *13 n.27 (citing Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163
(6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a fiduciary may not materially mislead those who are
owed a duty of loyalty)).
159. Id. at *8. The court used strong language to describe Varity's motives. See id.
160. Id. at *20. The order was entered as a preliminary injunction. Id.
161. Id.
In its first opinion,'6 2 the Eighth Circuit stated the issue merely as
one of "contract interpretation."" According to the Eighth Circuit,
plaintiffs carry the burden to prove they have vested welfare bene-
fits." The court interpreted the plan documents to read that employ-
ees only have the right to claim benefits for injuries or disabilities that
occurred before the termination of the plan.' Therefore, the court
held that only those employees who were injured or disabled prior to
the 1988 termination of the welfare plans would remain subject to the
injunction which restored their benefits."
In its second opinion, the Eighth Circuit again rejected all claims for
severance pay by employees who were still working when MCC termi-
nated operations. 67 The court based its decision primarily on language
in the company's personnel administration manuals which stated that
such payment "does not constitute a contractual relationship with the
employee.""6
For the remaining plaintiffs, the court first determined that the em-
ployer had breached its fiduciary duty by making affirmative misrep-
resentations."a The court next examined whether the breach allowed
162. The Eighth Circuit initially reviewed the district court's preliminary injunction
in Howe v. Varity Corp., 896 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1990) (Howe I). It then dealt with
the case as a whole in Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1994) (Howe III),
affd, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996). See infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Howe III. The court then clarified its opinion in Howe v. Varity Corp.,
41 F.3d 1263 (8th Cir. 1994).
163. Howe II, 896 F.2d at 1109.
164. Id. (citing Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 1512, 1517 (8th
Cir. 1988)).
165. Id. at 1110. The court noted that plan documents do not establish retirement
as the vesting point; moreover, the district court should not have relied on extrinsic
evidence when the documents were "unambiguous on their face." Id.
166. Id. at 1111-12. The case was remanded to determine who was eligible for ben-
efits under this revised standard. Id. at 1111. On remand, a jury trial was held, and
the employees, including those who were terminated without previously retiring, were
awarded approximately $10 million in actual damages and $36 million in punitive
damages for breach of contract, fraud, and ERISA violations. Howe III, 36 F.3d at
751. The district court judge, however, granted judgment as a matter of law in
Varity's favor as to the claims for severance pay by then-active employees who lost
their jobs. Id. Furthermore, the trial court set aside all punitive awards. Id. The em-
ployees who had retired prior to MCC's termination were given several choices, in-
cluding the jury award for actual damages or reinstatement into Massey-Ferguson's
benefits plan. Id. The retirees chose the jury award. Id.
167. Howe III, 36 F.3d at 752.
168. Id. The written policy was the critical issue, even though both Massey-
Ferguson and MCC had an established practice of paying these benefits previously.
Id. The court also rejected fraudulent misrepresentation theories because of preemp-
tion by ERISA. Id. at 753 (citing Consolidated Beef Indus. v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
949 F.2d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 1991)).
169. Id. at 753. The court noted that "'[a] fiduciary may not materially mislead
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individual beneficiaries a right of action under ERISA section
502(a)(3). 7° The court interpreted this section to allow individual re-
lief for the plan participants. 7' However, the court substantially limit-
ed that relief, relying on Mertens for its decision that restitution is the
appropriate form of relief." Accordingly, the court awarded the plain-
tiffs exactly what they would have received had they not been trans-
ferred to MCC.'7 3
.C. The Majority Opinion of the Supreme Court
On review, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court's opinion,74 holding that ERISA authorizes individualized equita-
ble relief for certain breaches of fiduciary obligations. 5 Justice
Breyer wrote for the majority, first examining the question of Varity's
fiduciary status. 6 Although Varity argued that it was acting solely as
an employer, and not as a plan administrator,'" the Court gave defer-
ence to the district court's factual findings.'78 The Court then applied
these facts to the definition of a fiduciary contained in ERISA section
3(21)(A)"v and concluded that Varity spoke as a plan administrator
those to whom the duties of loyalty and prudence described in 29 U.S.C. § 1104 are
owed.'" Id. (quoting Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163 (6th Cir.
1988)).
170. Id, at 754. The court first dismissed the company's reliance on Russell because
that case looked to § 502(a)(2),, disclaiming reliance on 502(a)(3). Id.; see supra
notes 98-110 and accompanying text.
171. Howe III, 36 F.3d at 755. The court cited Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
in Russell. Id.; see supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. The court also fol-
lowed the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit. Howe III, 36 F.3d at 755 (citing Anweiler
v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 993 (7th Cir. 1993) ("An individual
may seek equitable relief from a breach of fiduciary duty under section 1132(a)(3).")).
172. Howe III, 36 F.3d at 756. The court saw the $7.6 million in compensatory
damages awarded to the retirees as legal relief, not equitable relief. Id. By contrast,
restoring the retirees to their "rightful position" is restitution. Id. (citing Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257-58 (1993) (allowing such equitable relief under
§ 502(a)(3))).
173. Id.
174. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1079 (1996).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1071. Justice Breyer was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at 1067.
177. Id. at 1071. ERISA permits Varity to be both an employer and plan administra-
tor at different times. Id.; ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1994).
178. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1074; see supra Part Im.A (discussing the facts of Varify).
179. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
when it informed employees that transferring to MCC would not under-
mine the security they had in their benefits.' 8° The Court held that
making representations about the future of plan benefits is an act of
plan administration, and, therefore, the company acted as a fiduciary at
the time it made such representations.'8
The Court next addressed whether the company's actions violated
ERISA-imposed fiduciary duties." To this end, the Court looked to
section 404(a)," which requires a fiduciary to "'discharge his duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and ben-
eficiaries. '""8 The majority found that because the company knowingly
deceived the plan beneficiaries in order to save money, the company
failed to meet the "solely in the interest" test and breached its fiduciary
duty.'
The final question addressed by the Court concerned whether ERISA
section 502(a)(3) authorized individual relief for the participants in the
event of a breach."M Varity argued that, in light of Russell, it was clear
that Congress excluded individual relief."7 The majority, however, dis-
tinguished the plaintiff in Russell, who relied only on section 502(a)(2)
and who also had section 502(a)(1) to remedy her injury." The ma-
jority thus concluded that Russell did not control the issues in
Varity.'8
The Court then noted that the "catchall" language of section
502(a)(3),"9 along with congressional intent,'9' provided broad reme-
180. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1072-73.
181. Id. at 1074. The Court again deferred to the district court as to the facts and
inferences to be drawn from them. Id.
182. Id.
183. ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994); see supra notes 52-53 and ac-
companying text.
184. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1079 (quoting ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)).
The Court also looked to the common law duty of loyalty. Id. at 1075 (citing BOGERT
& BOGERT, supra note 27, § 543, at 218-19).
185. Id. at 1074-75.
186. Id. at 1075-79. The plaintiffs could not proceed under § 502(a)(1) because they
were "no longer members of the Massey-Ferguson plan, and, therefore, had no 'bene-
fits due [them].'" Id. at 1079 (quoting ERISA § 502(a)(1)). Similarly, the Court had
previously ruled that subsection (a)(2) provided no remedies for individuals. Id.; see
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985). For a discussion
of Russeil, see supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
187. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1076.
188. Id.; see supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
189. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1076.
190. Id. at 1077.
191. Id. at 1078 (citing S. REP. No. 93-127, at 35 (1973) and H.R. REP. No. 93-533,
at 17 (1973) (stating that the Senate and House intended to "provide . . . participants
and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of
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dies for stopping violations of ERISA.' The Court found that the
common law of trusts required a plan administrator to be impartial.'93
In summary, the majority found that granting individual remedies is
consistent with the language of ERISA, congressional intent, and the
common law of trusts."° Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment
of the court of appeals.9 '
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Writing for the dissent, Justice Thomas" rejected the majority opin-
ion because it could not comport with the text or structure of
ERISA. "'97 Additionally, the dissent argued that the holding should not
be distinguished from that in Russell. 98 Consequently, Varity could not
be held to have breached any fiduciary obligation."° Further, the dis-
sent asserted that even if a breach occurred, the individuals had no
remedy.2"
Justice Thomas noted that in creating ERISA, Congress had to bal-
ance many competing, powerful interests,"' and as a result, the sec-
tions of ERISA which assigned fiduciary duties and responsibilities
were crafted with particular care.0 2 Therefore, he argued that section
502(a)(3) must be read in context with surrounding portions of the
code and with the Court's precedent in Russell. 203 Because section
[ERISA]")).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1078-79; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183, 232 (1957) (dis-
cussing the duty of impartiality).
194. Varlty, 116 S. Ct. at 1079.
195. Id
196. Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined in the dissenting opinion. Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
197. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 1083 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985)).
199. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 1080 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S.
248 (1993)).
202. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Thomas looked to § 409, that
portion contained in Part 4 of the Act's regulatory provisions, entitled "Fiduciary
Responsibility." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). This section of the code creates liability,
but requires § 502(a)(2) to enforce it. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Russell, 473 U.S. at 146).
502(a)(3) failed to mention fiduciary duty, Justice Thomas concluded
that Congress intended section 502(a)(2) to "provide the exclusive
mechanism for bringing claims for breach of fiduciary duty."2' Thus,
Justice Thomas argued that the reasoning of the Court in Russell ap-
plied, and individual relief should have been foreclosed."5
Justice Thomas concluded that even if ERISA authorized individual
recovery for breach of fiduciary duty, Varity did nothing actionable as a
breach of fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA.2" He based this con-
clusion on the premise that section 3(21)(A)0 7 considers an employer
to be a fiduciary "only 'to the extent' that 'he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of [the]
plan.'"2' Justice Thomas reasoned that because Varity acted as an em-
ployer and not a plan administrator at the time the conduct occurred,
Varity owed no fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries.2' Further, Justice
Thomas did not consider Varity's conduct a breach of any duty because
the company warned its employees that employment conditions would
be determined by the success of MCC, and plan documents clearly re-
served Varity's right to terminate or alter the plans in any way.2"'
Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded that "courts should not feel com-
pelled to bind employers to the strict fiduciary standards of ERISA just
because an ordinary business decision results in an adverse impact on
the plan."21'
204. Id. at 1081 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas compared § 502(a)(2),
which specifically incorporates § 409's fiduciary breach, with the more generally
worded § 502(a)(3), concluding that the specific provision must govern the general.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,
384 (1992) (noting that in statutory construction, the specific governs the general)).
205. Id. at 1083 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at ,1084 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
207. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
208. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1085 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting ERISA
§ 3(21)(A)(iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii) (1994)).
209. Id. at 1085-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). To reach this conclusion, Justice
Thomas noted that "'ERISA does not require that "day-to-day" corporate business
transactions . . . be performed solely in the interest of plan participants.'" Id. at 1086
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947
(1990)). Further, the language of the statute, not the common law of trusts, must be
the starting point in the analysis. Id. at 1085 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)). Justice Thomas espoused that any
communication by Varity with employees regarding the transfer, even if untrue, was
in the role of employer under the limits in ERISA, and not under any broader com-
mon law. Id. at 1088 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas emphasized that "the
determinative factor is not truthfulness but the capacity in which the statement is
made." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 1090 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 1091 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
In the context of downsizing or even day-to-day decision-making,
management often confronts the competing interests of shareholders,
employees, and other stakeholders. Congress faced similar competing
needs and demands when creating ERISA. 12 The Court in Varity, de-
spite reacting to recent changes in the corporate environment," 3 still
looked to congressional intent and the common law of trusts to correct-
ly rule that ERISA allows individual relief for plan beneficiaries and
participants."4 The majority opinion, however, went too far when it
limited the relief under section 502(a)(3) to restitution."'5 In addition,
the majority made no attempt to define the critical term "misled."1 6
The decision, however, was a clear change in direction away from the
narrowing of plan participants' rights under the Court's prior opinions
in Russell and Mertens.
A. The Opinions in Varity
In first determining that Varity was acting as a fiduciary when it took
the actions it did, the majority looked to common law and ERISA, al-
though the dissent stated that only ERISA should be relevant."7 The
Court had already addressed that concept a decade earlier, however,
when it found that "rather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers
and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the com-
mon law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and
responsibility."" ' Although the fiduciary concept was already broadly
defined by the common law, Congress enacted ERISA because common
law did not offer enough benefit plan protection."9
212. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1993).
213. Such changes include the use of employee downsizing and benefit reduction as
a general management tool. See supra notes 20, 25-26 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing reasons for corporate downsizing and the impact on employees before
ERISA).
214. See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
215. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1079.
216. See infra notes 283-87 for proposals to correct these shortcomings.
217. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1085 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
218. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp.
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 578 (1985).
219. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 11 (1973); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (reconciling the scope of a fiduciary's duties and
authority).
The dissent cited Mertens to rationalize a narrow definition of "fidu-
ciary."22 Justice Thomas, however, conveniently dropped the phrase
"thus expanding the universe of persons subject to fiduciary
dut[ies]-and to damages""' from his discussion of Mertens.22 The
Court in Mertens was using the functional definition of a trustee to
expand, not contract, the definition. 3
When Varity intentionally communicated with employees about the
security of their benefits, it engaged in an act of plan administration,
and therefore became subject to fiduciary responsibility.224 The dissent
saw this communication as solely the act of an employer, but admitted
that "[e]mployers who choose to administer their own plans assume
responsibilities to both the company and the plan, and, accordingly,
owe duties of loyalty and care to both entities."225 If so, the corpo-
ration made it difficult to determine whether it even attempted any
balance with the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Varity
Corporation's statement that, by shifting thousands of retirees' pensions
into MCC, he "unloaded his losers" and "delighted" in getting out from
under the obligations. 6
The communication by Varity executives to employees, which
foreseeably affected employees' choices respecting plan benefits, may
have had some business purposes. 7 A participant, asked only to de-
cide whether to make decisions with regard to the plans, would have
reasonably believed the employer was answering questions about the
safety of the plans in its role as plan administrator.' When an em-
220. Varify, 116 S. Ct. at 1085 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993)).
221. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262.
222. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1085 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent
looked to the same definition in § 3(21)(A) as the majority, but unilaterally inserted
the word "only" into the wording of the statute to try to narrow its applicability. Id.
at 1089 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
223. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262.
224. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1074. This is the weakest link in the majority opinion, but
plan administrators are required to give beneficiaries information regarding the plan.
See ERISA §§ 102, 104, 105; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022, 1024, 1025 (1994). Communicating in
the manner and content chosen by Varity was a means of performing the duties
imposed by the plan. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1074. When a person or entity performs
these duties, fiduciary responsibility attaches. Id. See generally 2A SCorr & FRATCHER,
supra note 30, § 164, at 250-53 (explaining duties and powers of trustee). When in-
formation regarding the plan is compiled, a fiduciary duty arises. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at
1073.
225. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1084 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
226. Howe v. Varity Corp, 36 F.3d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1994) (Howe III), affd, 116 S.
Ct. 1065 (1996).
227. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1086 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 1072.
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ployer conflates its multiple roles in a single communication dealing
with plan benefits, the employer bears a risk that it will be found to
have spoken as a fiduciary.'s There is "a duty to communicate to the
beneficiary material facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary which
[the company] knows the beneficiary does not know." '
"MCC was an empty vessel.., with enormous debt, junk for hard
assets and nearly three times as many retirees as employees.""' Varity
retained corporate-wide responsibility for less than 400 retirees, all of
whom were former executives or employees from the head office.'
The executive decisions that affected the plan, its participants, and its
beneficiaries were not the by-product of normal management decisions.
Rather, the decision to negatively affect the plans and participants was
creatively implemented by the company acting as a plan administrator,
and therefore subjected the company to fiduciary duties and respon-
sibilities.' When an administrator explains plan benefits to employ-
ees, it acts in a fiduciary capacity.'
A duty of loyalty exists to administer a plan solely in the interest of
the beneficiary.' This duty comes from the trust relationship rather
229. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Howe v. Varity, 36 F.3d
746 (8th Cir. 1994) (No. 94-1471), affd, 116 S. Ct 1065 (1996).
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959). An individual must
know "exactly where he stands with respect to the plan." H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 11
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649.
231. Howe v. Varity Corp., 1989 WL 95595, at *8 (S.D. Iowa Jul. 14, 1989) (Howe 1).
232. Id. at *8 n.16. The thousands of retirees who were "transferred" never knew
about it until MCC failed and their benefits stopped. Howe III, 36 F.3d at 750.
233. The mere act of reorganizing parts of a company, even one in financial diffi-
culty, should not automatically be construed as acting in a fiduciary capacity. When
the primary motive, however, is to impact the plan and its beneficiaries, whether for
positive or negative purposes, the company and its involved executives have under-
taken a fiduciary role. The assumption of this role and the problems it causes
prompted Congress to create ERISA. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text
Varity executives held seats on MCC's board of directors (including the chairman,
who was also Varity's president) which explicitly retained authority over the benefit
plans. Howe 1, 1989 WL 95595, at *6.
234. In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1261 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding that when a plan administrator explains plan benefits to its em-
ployees, it acts in a fiduciary capacity), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996); see also
Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
company was not acting as a fiduciary in deciding the fate of welfare benefits plan);
Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 910 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that em-
ployers must satisfy fiduciary duties when administering benefit plans).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 170 (1959).
than from any trust instrument.2 Selfish interests must be exclud-
ed, 7 and actions must be exclusively for the benefit of a plan's par-
ticipants and beneficiaries."
The majority found that the company knowingly breached its duty to
deal fairly and honestly by its cognizant and significant deception of the
beneficiaries in order to save money at the expense of the beneficia-
ries." The company had the right to terminate the plans and could
have done so for those who were not vested at the time, handling what-
ever employee morale issues that developed in a more forthright, pro-
fessional manner. Lying is not consistent with the duty of a fiducia-
ry 240 The dissent, while agreeing that the company was intentionally
untruthful, 241 saw the activity as a part of day-to-day corporate deci-
sions which had a collateral effect on prospective employee bene-
fits. 242 The dissent argued that "ordinary business decisions... may
be made without fear of liability for breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA, even though they may turn out to have negative consequences
for plan participants. " ' This concept is conceptually correct,244 but
failed in its implementation at Varity because the company's decisions
were not "ordinary business decisions. "245 The facts of the case246
dictate that the company knowingly took on multiple roles, which af-
fected ERISA-protected plans, and then knowingly took actions to de-
ceive plan beneficiaries and participants.
2 47
236. CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR. & ERIC P. HAYES, LORING: A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK
§ 6.1.3, at 112 (7th ed. 1994).
237. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 27, at § 543. There is a public policy behind
this duty of loyalty, and conflicts must be avoided. Id.; see Woods v. City Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268-69 (1941) (stating a fiduciary cannot serve conflicting
interests); NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 330 (1981) (noting there is an es-
tablished rule against divided loyalties).
238. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 309 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5039, 5089 (stating that dual loyalties must be avoided under ERISA). When Congress
amended ERISA in 1980 (regarding multi-employer plans), it reaffirmed that trustees'
actions must be solely in the best interest of the beneficiaries. See H.R. REP. No. 96-
869, pt. 1, at 67 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2918, 2935.
239. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1074-75 (1996).
240. Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn Mut. Life Ins., 698 F.2d
320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983).
241. Vaity, 116 S. Ct. at 1088 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas did not see
this as determinative because in his opinion the company was not acting as a fidu-
ciary when the statement was made. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 1086 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
243. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
244. Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990).
245. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1074.
246. The majority considered the lower courts' transcripts and findings of egregious-
ness in reaching their decision. Id. at 1071-72.
247. Id. at 1072-74.
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The dissent argued that the company could have achieved many of its
objectives legitimately, via plan termination and employee termina-
tion,2' but because Varity chose the deceptive path, the Court correct-
ly held that the company violated the obligations imposed by
ERISA 249 "[I]t is Black-letter trust law that fiduciaries owe strict du-
ties running directly to beneficiaries in the administration and payment
of trust benefits."25
No matter how broadly worded the plan documents may be in con-
ferring discretion, the plan administrator will "never be permitted to act
dishonestly or in bad faith."25' Courts have read section 404 as impos-
ing an unwavering duty to make decisions prudently, "with single-mind-
ed devotion to a plan's participants and beneficiaries."252 Varity's deci-
sions, as plan administrator, were neither made nor implemented with
this standard of devotion." A plan administrator must speak truthful-
ly whenever it speaks." Making material, affirmative misrepresenta-
tiois to plan participants constitutes a breach of fiduciary responsibili-
ty.
25 5
In determining whether relief for these violations was available to
individuals under section 502(a)(3), the majority looked to the text of
the legislation and to the intent of Congress." The Court reasoned
that Congress would not textually immunize fiduciaries when their
breaches cause harm to individuals. 7 The dissent interpreted the tex-
248. Id. at 1087 & n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 1074.
250. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 152-53 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring); see also 2A Scor & FRATCHER, supra note 30, § 170, at
311.
251. 3 Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 30, § 187.4, at 44. When the actions are not
in bad faith, a court will interfere if there is an improper motive. Id. § 187.5, at 46.
In considering improper motives, the court may consider whether the fiduciary has a
conflict of interest with that of the plan beneficiaries. Id. at 47.
252. Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 946-47 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing
Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also Berlin v. Michigan Tel.
Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1162 (6th Cir. 1988).
253. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1074.
254. Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994).
255. Id.; see ROUNDS & HAYES, supra note 236, § 6.1.5.1, at 136 (stating that a bene-
ficiary must be provided with all the information needed to protect his interest); see
also 3 Scor & FRATCHER, supra note 30, § 170.25, at 436 (revealing that a fiduciary
must make full disclosure and take no advantage of its position).
256. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1078-79.
257. Id.
tual argument as plausible, but only if it is read without reference to
the surrounding text, and concluded that Congress did not want to
offer such relief.2"
It is illogical, however, that Congress did not want to offer individual
relief. If section 502(a)(3) did not permit lawsuits for individualized
harm caused by a breach of the duty of loyalty owed to the individual,
an anomalous gap would be created in what Congress intended to be a
comprehensive enforcement scheme.2 59 Violations of the strict duty of
loyalty imposed by ERISA may cause injury to certain participants or
beneficiaries, yet not affect the plan as a whole.2" Allowing an em-
ployer to breach its fiduciary duty to an individual who would have no
standing to state a claim under ERISA was not the intent of Con-
gress.2"' That interpretation fits with the Court's determination that
Congress crafted the remedial scheme in ERISA with deliberate
care.
262
Furthermore, the plain language of section 502(a)(3) 21 is consistent
with the stated purpose of ERISA and its incorporated conmon law of
trusts. The Court has acknowledged that Congress created ERISA "to
promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee
benefit plans."2" The key to statutory construction is to give effect to
the plain meaning of the words used by Congress.2 5 The common law
similarly supports this view.2  It is therefore logical to find Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in Russell, that individual recovery is
available under section 502(a)(3), persuasive.267
258. Id. at 1080-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
259. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Howe v. Varity, 36
F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1994) (No. 94-1471), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996).
260. Bixler v. Central Pa Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1282, 1298 (3d
Cir. 1993).
261. Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 702 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Mullins v.
Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1994).
262. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 57 for the text of § 502(a).
264. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (quoting Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)).
265. Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (1995). Even Justice Thomas
agreed that the textual argument is plausible when read without reference to the sur-
rounding text. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1080 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
266. See, e.g., RoUNDS & HAYES, supra note 236, § 7.2, at 170 (stating that a fiducia-
ry is liable to the beneficiary for breach of duty).
267. Massachusetts Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 143 (1985) (Brennan,
J., concurring). Joined by three other Justices, Justice Brennan argued that
§ 502(a)(3) provides individual relief while § 502(a)(2) combines with § 409 to pro-
vide the broader relief on behalf of the plan itself. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring); see
Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1298 (3d Cir.
1993) (finding Justice Brennan's analysis persuasive). For further discussion regarding
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The dissent in Varity found Russell all but dispositive on the is-
sue.2" Russell is distinguishable, however, on several levels, the most
important of which is the section of ERISA upon which the plaintiffs re-
lied in pursuing their claims.2" The Court in Russell noted that the
plaintiff "expressly disclaims reliance on section 502(a)(3),"27 ° the very
section relied on in Varity." Any dicta in Russell which infers broad-
er application is not binding." Each of the subsections of section
502(a) have specific purposes,273 with section 502(a)(2) intentionally
tied to plan relief pursuant to section 409. The Court in Russell took
great pains to link section 502(a)(2) solely to section 409,"' thus it is
a tortured path for the Varity dissenters to trace the Russell majority's
steps through these sections in order to limit section 502(a)(3). Con-
gress logically added section 502(a)(3) as an independent remedial pro-
vision in ERISA.. which does not exclude individual relief.
Once the Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit in Howe III, it also af-
firmed that court's view that Mertens controls what actual relief is
available to the individuals who were harmed by the breach.276 The
Court in Mertens, however, based its decision on an old distinction
between the courts of equity and the courts of law.27 The dissent in
the ability of § 502(a)(3) to stand on its own language, see MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUAU-
FIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 1035-38 (1996).
268. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1084 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that
Russell protected all plan participants via a "single remedy on behalf of the plan" un-
der § 502(a)(2), that this holding was consistent with Congress's intent to prevent
individual relief for beneficiaries, and therefore, that it should be extended to
§ 502(a)(3). Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
269. Russell is distinguishable from Varity on the facts, which may have influenced
the outcome. In Russell, the plaintiff previously received restitution of disallowed
benefits for her back injury by simply seeking a reevaluation by the plan adminis-
trator and was now seeking punitive damages. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136-38. In contrast,
Varity involved thousands of employees who had been intentionally deceived out of
their basic benefits. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1074.
270. Russell, 473 U.S. at 139 n.5.
271. The majority in Varity noted that Russell did not provide for individual relief
under § 50 2 (a)(2 ), and that the plaintiffs in Varity relied upon § 502(a)(3) for indi-
vidual relief. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1079.
272. Russell, 473 U.S. at 150-51 (Brennan, J., concurring).
273. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
274. Russell, 473 U.S. at 139-42.
275. For further discussion as to how § 502(a)(3) operates independently, see
CANAN, supra note 267, § 21.2, at 1031-37.
276. Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1994) (Howe II), affd, 116 S.
Ct. 1065 (1996).
277. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993). For a discussion of the
Mertens noted that the decision would strip beneficiaries of a remedy
they enjoyed in the equity courts under common law.2" The Court in
Varity, therefore, should have overruled Mertens279 explicitly or at
least distinguished it."8 It is reasonable that Congress provided reme-
dies for breaches in a "catchall" fashion28' because the intent was to
provide "'participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for re-
dressing or preventing violations of [ERISA].' 28 2 The Court in Varity
did not provide that broad remedy when it affirmed the Eighth Circuit.
B. Unanswered Question and Proposals
The Court's decision made no attempt to define the critical term
"misled." 's This adjudication, of course, will always be fact-specific in
nature, but further guidance is needed.
To help guide employers and plan administrators, Congress should
add an ERISA regulation defining when employees are "misled" and
what constitutes a "deceitful" practice where organizations make major
downsizing moves." At least one safe harbor provision should be
strained analysis Justice Scalia used to reach the majority decision in Mertens, see
Supreme Court's Decision in Mertens Limits Equitable Relief Available Under
ERISA, 2 LMG. REP. 3 (1993). The courts of equity did not have the power to award
punitive damages. Some courts have recently awarded them only where the breach of
fiduciary duty involves fraud or malice. See ROUNDS & HAYES, supra note 236,
§ 7.2.3.3, at 175.
278. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263-64 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined in
the dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and O'Connor. Id. at 263
(White, J., dissenting).
279. A complete analysis of Mertens is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discus-
sion outlining the reasons why it should be reversed, see Darroch, supra note 117.
280. The facts in Mertens are distinguishable from those in Varity because in
Mertens a non-fiduciary was being sued. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 253. It was therefore
logical to enforce lesser penalties because lesser duties attach to a non-fiduciary.
281. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1077-78 (1996). Under the law of trusts,
a breach of trust may lead to a remedy of monetary damages. Warren v. Society
Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975, 982 (6th Cir. 1990); see Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 154 n.10 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that trust law
remedies provide money damages); see also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 27, § 862
(discussing the payment of damages by a trustee for breach of trust).
282. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1078 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-127, at 35 (1973) and H.R.
REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1974)).
283. Throughout Varity and its corresponding lower court opinions, the courts used
terms such as "misled," "deceiving," and "intentional misrepresentation" to describe
the company's actions. Id. at 1066-67; Howe v. Varity, 36 F.3d 746, 750, 753-54 (8th
Cir. 1994) (Howe III), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996).
284. An objective guideline would be helpful because, as Justice Thomas noted,
management must make day-to-day decisions which have a corollary or even unin-
tended impact on the plans and their beneficiaries. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1086 (Thom-
as, J., dissenting).
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time-related; when management chooses to restructure certain units
and the restructured units survive twenty-four months or more, a rebut-
table presumption should arise that the employees were not misled into
taking an unnecessary risk in transferring to the new division.
If a company fails to meet the safe harbor element, the next test level
should parallel the inquiries courts have made in age discrimination
cases.' The most employer-friendly approach would assimilate the
"but for" test used by the Seventh Circuit.' Under this approach, a
deceptive practice occurs if the employer would not have restructured
but for the opportunity to escape benefit obligations. 7 The regulation
should not, however, remove an employer's documented rights to termi-
nate a plan in a forthright manner.
Congress must also address remedies for the intentional deception
situation. Currently, an executive pressured to save cash or cut losses
for a company would wisely imitate Varity Corporation,' primarily
because the Supreme Court's decisions have limited the cost of viola-
tion to restitution.' The worst that could happen, therefore, would
be that the company would have to pay only what it would have paid
out despite the deception. Thus, if the company can steer through the
litigation, it can realize significant material savings. Therefore, clear
incentives exist to make the same fundamental decision made by Varity
Corporation.
To dissuade executives from being attracted to this "no lose" situa-
tion, Congress should add certain punitive damage remedies for both
the plans and the individuals. However, because punitive damages are
anathema to the public and to many present legislators, such damages
should be capped. One capping method would be the treble damage
approach used in other areas of federal law.' An even more useful
method would channel the majority of these punitive damages into the
PBGC fund. This approach is appropriate because ERISA and the PBGC
285. Courts make these inquiries into violations of the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
286. See supra note 23.
287. To lower the number of preemptory lawsuits, thresholds must first be cleared,
including an actual, substantial decrease in the ability to provide vested benefits.
288. See infra Part V for further discussion as to how this could occur even after
the decision in Varity.
289. See supra notes 172-73, 215 and accompanying text
290. See, e.g., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (1994); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994) (antitrust violations).
were created to protect against egregious actions by employers and
fiduciaries. Furthermore, this damage structure would permit reduced
insurance payments into the fund by the many employers who act with-
in the rules and spirit of ERISA.
V. IMPACT
While the Court correctly decided most of the elements of Varity, the
ruling opened the door to increased litigation."' One area in particular
will probably be affected: the decision created an effective route around
the shield that ERISA provides from certain common law and state law
causes of action.' In light of Varity, courts are already reexamining
cases that would otherwise be disposed of by ERISA's preemption of
these matters.m
The decision in Varity may encourage some employers to attempt
what Varity Corporation tried to accomplish. Because the Court looked
to how the .company tried to do it rather than what it tried to do, cor-
porate executives may have a legitimate temptation to restructure fail-
ing entities into new units.2' 4 After Varity, however, the employers
will have to be frank with the employees as to the risks, even while
reminding the employees that the plans may otherwise be terminated at
will.
The Court noted that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce feared that one
impact of the decision in Varity would be fiduciaries fearfully paying
out every cent they could. 5 The Court, however, correctly perceived
this to be a non-issue because fiduciaries are similarly charged with
preserving assets in order to take impartial account of all beneficia-
291. Attorneys are already predicting a substantial increase in litigation over benefit
plans altered by downsizing. See Greenburg, supra note 11, § 1, at 1.
292. The preemption is created by § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. 1144(a) (1994).
293. See, e.g., Degnan v. Publicker Indus., 83 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1996). The district
court in Degnan had rejected the common law claim of an employee who showed
that his employer had first misrepresented an inducement to take early retirement,
and then stopped paying. Id. at 28-29. The court rejected this claim because of
ERISA's preemption clause in § 514(a). Id. The First Circuit agreed that ordinarily no
relief existed, but mindful of Varity, gave leave to the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint charging an ERISA violation. Id. at 29-30; see also Smith v. Texas
Children's Hosp., 84 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1996) (remanding plaintiffs claim for individu-
al relief as to benefits cut off when she contracted multiple sclerosis, because of the
Court's recent decision in Varity).
294. This is partly due to the lack of any downside risk, since the maximum loss is
restitution.
295. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1078 (1996) (citing Brief for Chamber of
Commerce as Amicus Curiae at 11, Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1994)
(No. 94-1471), ffd, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996).
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ries. Thus, little change appears likely in this area. Most of the activ-
ity will likely center on the areas of individual litigation and corporate
downsizing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Varity clearly reversed a trend that
was narrowing the protection offered under ERISA. The Court correctly
held that an individual has the right to relief under ERISA, which is an
important consideration because the statute locks out employees and
retirees from more traditional venues of relief in state courts.
As a result of broader employee protection, companies will now have
to reexamine the risks versus the rewards of further downsizing deci-
sions affecting benefit plans. Although a flurry of individual suits may
be expected in the near future, this increase in litigation will ultimately
slow as the courts define the extent of this important decision.
296. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1078; see also 3 SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 30, § 214.

